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FOREWORD: NEITHER VICTIMS NOR
EXECUTIONERS
WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR.*
I.
On February 22, 1994, Justice Blackmun dissented from the
denial of certiorari in Callins v. Collins,1 in which a Texas pris-
oner convicted of murder and sentenced to death challenged the
constitutional validity of his conviction and sentence. Justice
Blackmun concluded that the death penalty cannot be imposed
fairly and with reasonable consistency, as required by the Consti-
tution.2 What I find most extraordinary about Justice Black-
mun's dissenting opinion is the very fact that it may fairly be
described as extraordinary: the opinion adopts what certainly
has become a remarkable view-indeed, a unique one-among
the justices of the Supreme Court.
This state of affairs prevails despite the indisputable fact that
more than twenty years after the Court's opinion in Furman v.
Georgia, "the death penalty remains fraught with arbitrariness,
discrimination, caprice, and mistake."' This assessment cannot
be dismissed as the mere recitation of platitudes. I will not replay
the Court's death penalty jurisprudence since Furman, nor
attempt an exhaustive survey of the empirical evidence or the
academic literature. A few tragic facts should suffice to demon-
strate the accuracy of Justice Blackmun's appraisal.
Although a (bare) majority of the Court turned a blind eye
on the evidence in McCleskey v. Kemp,4 it was then, and it remains
today, an uncontroverted fact that the race of a capital defendant
and that of his victim play a prominent role in determining
whether the defendant lives or dies.5 The statistics paint a chil-
* Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States (retired).
1. 510 U.S. -, 62 U.S.L.W. 3546, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 1327 (1994).
2. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); cf. McGautha v. California,
402 U.S. 183, 248 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
3. Callins, 510 U.S. at -, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 1327 at *6 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
4. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
5. Id. at 321-22 (Brennan,J., dissenting); see also David C. Baldus, Charles
Pulaski, and George Woodworth, Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An
Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74J. CraM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661 (1983);
Samuel R. Gross and Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial
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ling portrait of racial discrimination. The seminal Baldus study6
on which the defendant relied in McCleskey v. Kemp demonstrated
that in Georgia, blacks who kill whites are sentenced to death "at
nearly 22 times the rate of blacks who kill blacks, and more than 7
times the rate of whites who kill blacks."7 The statistics regarding
actual executions are equally stark. Since the Court's 1976 deci-
sion in Gregg v. Georgia,8 there have been 228 executions carried
out throughout the country; the underlying murders involved
307 victims.9 In these cases resulting in execution, more than 8
of every 10 victims were white," ° although only half of all murder
victims during the same period were white. 1 The comparison of
executions in various types of "cross-race" murders is even more
striking. The vast majority of all murders, upwards of 90%,
involve a perpetrator and victim of the same race. 12 Among the
relatively small group of cross-race murders, "black-on-white"
murders are about two and one-quarter times more common
than "white-on-black" murders. 3 However, of the 228 persons
executed over the last 17 years, 80 black defendants were exe-
cuted for the murders of white victims (35% of all executions),
and only one white defendant was executed for the murder of a
black victim (0.44% of all executions).' 4
Racial disparity is but one of a host of inequalities that
inheres in the death penalty. Another is the stunning lack of
counsel adequately equipped to afford capital defendants a fair
opportunity to defend their lives in the courtroom. Justice
Thurgood Marshall described the situation this way:
Death penalty litigation has become a specialized field of
practice, and even the most well intentioned attorneys
often are unable to recognize, preserve, and defend their
Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimizing, 37 STAN. L. REV. 27
(1984); Michael L. Radelet and Glenn L. Pierce, Race and Prosecutorial Discretion
in Homicide Cases, 19 L. & Soc'v REv. 587 (1985).
6. See Baldus, et al., supra note 5.
7. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 327 (emphasis in original).
8. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
9. See NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., DEATH Row
U.S.A. 522 (Oct, 1993) (documenting 222 executions through October 6,
1993); Unpublished statistics (on file at the Supreme Court Library)
(documenting 6 executions since October 7, 1993).
10. See sources cited supra note 9.
11. See "Victim/Offender Relationship by Race and Sex" tables printed
annually in U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS (1977-1992).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See sources cited supra note 9.
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client's rights. Often trial counsel simply are unfamiliar
with the special rules that apply in capital cases. Counsel-
whether appointed or retained-often are handling their
first criminal cases, or their first murder cases, when con-
fronted with the prospect of a death penalty. Though act-
ing in good faith, they often make very serious mistakes. 15
The case reporters and academic literature are filled with count-
less accounts of inadequate legal representation in capital cases,
both at the trial and sentencing phases.' 6 As Justice Marshall
observed, the problem can be attributed in part to a shortage of
defense counsel with adequate training and experience. But
even in cases involving competent counsel, there almost invaria-
bly exists a lack of the necessary time and money to prepare a
constitutionally adequate defense. 7 Notwithstanding the heroic
efforts of resource centers and appellate projects throughout the
country, the meager hourly rates and expenditure caps that
many states impose on appointed counsel in capital cases do not
suggest that a solution to this crisis is imminent.
A closely related symptom of this diseased death penalty sys-
tem is the shocking frequency with which reviewing courts find
constitutional error in capital convictions and sentences. Even
conservative estimates place the total reversal rate at an astound-
ing 45%; some commentators believe the figure may be as high
as 60% or more.'" Federal courts exercising habeas corpus review,
15. Thurgood Marshall, Remarks on the Death Penalty Made at the Judicial
Conference of the Second Circuit, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1986); see also Michael
Mello, Facing Death Alone: The Post-Conviction Attorney Crisis on Death Row, 37 AM.
U. L. REv. 513 (1988); Roy Brasfield Herron, Defending Life in Tennessee Cases, 51
TENN. L. REv. 681 (1984); Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance
of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 299 (1983).
16. See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, Fred Strasser, and Marianne Lavelle, Fatal
Defense: Trial and Error in the Nation's Death Belt, NAT'L L.J., June 11, 1990, at 30;
Vivian Berger, The Chiropractor as Brain Surgeon: Defense Lawyering in Capital
Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 245, 245-49 (1991); Mello, supra note
15, at 567-85; Goodpaster, supra note 15, at 300-302.
17. Numerous commentators have argued that the assistance of counsel
standard adopted in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), as applied to
representation in capital proceedings, falls woefully short of guaranteeing a
constitutionally adequate defense. See, e.g., Goodpaster, supra note 15; Berger,
supra note 16.
18. SeeJack Greenberg, Against the American System of Capital Punishment,
99 HARv. L. REv. 1670, 1672 (1986) ("[A]bout forty-five percent of capital
judgments which were reviewed [betweenJanuary 1, 1982 and October 1, 1985]
were set aside by one court or another.") (citation omitted);James S. Liebman,
More Than "Slightly Retro:" The Rehnquist Court's Rout of Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction
in Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. Ruv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 537, 541 n. 15 (1991)
(citing numerous studies suggesting that "the reversal rate in capital cases as a
whole was probably 60% or more" between mid-1976 and mid-1991).
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despite an ever-expanding gauntlet of extra-statutory constraints
imposed by the Rehnquist Court,19 have found constitutional
error in nearly half of all the cases that reach them.2° Anthony
Amsterdam has explained the piercing indictment this figure
conveys:
In every one of these cases [in which federal habeas relief
was granted], the inmate's claim had been rejected by a
state trial court and by the state's highest court, at least
once and often a second time in state post-conviction pro-
ceedings; the Supreme Court had usually denied certiorari
at least once and sometimes twice; and a federal district
court [in those cases reaching a court of appeals] had then
rejected the inmate's claims of federal constitutional error
infecting his conviction and/or death sentence.21
Perhaps the bleakest fact of all is that the death penalty is
imposed not only in a freakish and discriminatory manner, but
also in some cases upon defendants who are actually innocent.22
In sum, as Jack Greenberg has trenchantly observed, "[d] eath
penalty proponents have assumed a system of capital punishment
that simply does not exist .... 23
II.
While I concur in Justice Blackmun's miserable assessment
of the death penalty system that actually does exist in this coun-
try, I have also long held the view that the death penalty is in all
circumstances an uncivilized and inhuman punishment inconsis-
tent with the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution.24 The
19. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, - U.S.-, 113 S. Ct. 2325 (1993); Keeney
v. Tamayo-Reyes, - U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 1715 (1992); Coleman v. Thompson, 501
U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991); Butler
v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
20. See Liebman, supra note 18, at 541 n.15.
21. Anthony G. Amsterdam, In Favorem Mortis: The Supreme Court and
Capital Punishment, 14 HUM. RTS. (A.B.A. SEc. INDMVDUAL RTs. & REsp.) 14
(1987).
22. See Hugo Adam Bedau and Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages ofJustice in
Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REv. 21, 36, 173-79 (1987);
23. Greenberg, supra note 18, at 1670. These critical facts undercut the
Court's continuing adherence to the position that the death penalty is
constitutional. "[T] he Court's 1976 opinions approving several capital schemes
were in an important sense provisional. They were based to an unusually
significant degree on specific empirical claims about the possibility of reliable
and evenhanded administration of the death penalty." Jordan Steiker, The Long
Road Up from Barbarism: Thurgood Marshall and the Death Penalty, 71 TEX. L. REV.
1131 (1993).
24. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 257 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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legal reasoning which led me to this view, and which convinced
me to reject competing arguments, bears repeating.
I began my opinion in Furman with the recognition that it is
difficult to define precisely the constitutional words "cruel and
unusual. 25 What we do know about the drafting and adoption
of the Eighth Amendment sheds little light on its precise mean-
ing, or on the Framers' intent in including its protections among
those enumerated in the Bill of Rights. 26 The Framers appar-
ently intended to ban torturous punishments.27 But it also
appears that they contemplated that the Eighth Amendment was
neither "limited to the proscription of unspeakable atrocities [,
nor intended] simply to forbid punishments considered 'cruel
and unusual' at the time." 21 Indeed, all of the dissenters in
Fuman joined the opinion of Chief Justice Burger, who wrote
that "the Eighth Amendment prohibition cannot fairly be limited
to those punishments thought excessively cruel and barbarous at
the time of the adoption of the Eighth Amendment. "29 Anyone
defending the narrow historical approach that the Court unani-
mously rejected in Furman3° must also be prepared to defend the
contemporary use of pillorying, branding, and cropping and
nailing of the ears, all of which were practiced in this country
during colonial times.3"
Some have advanced the simplistic and superficially attrac-
tive textual argument that even if we do not know exactly what the
Framers meant by cruel and unusual, we do know with certainty
that they did not regard capital punishment as constitutionally
impermissible because the Fifth Amendment 2 "authorizes" the
death penalty in certain circumstances.33 But the language of
the Fifth Amendment does not declare that the right of the state
to punish by death shall be inviolable; it merely requires that
25. Id. at 258.
26. See id. at 258-64.
27. See id. at 258-60 (discussing debates in the state ratifying conventions
of Massachusetts and Virginia).
28. Id. at 263.
29. Id. at 382 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
30. See also Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910); Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86 (1958).
31. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 414 (Powell, J., dissenting).
32. "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury ....
[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb,. . . nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
33. See, e.g., Callins, 510 U.S. at -, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 1327 at *1 (ScaliaJ.,
concurring); Ernest van den Haag, The Death Penalty Once More, 18 U.C. DAvis L.
REv. 957 (1985).
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when and if death is a possible punishment, the defendant shall
enjoy certain procedural safeguards. Turning to the Eighth
Amendment itself-the section of the Constitution that deals
specifically with limitations on the state's penal power-we find
no language which suggests that the death penalty was to be for-
ever regarded as outside the scope of its prohibition.
The proponents of the textual argument insist that the allu-
sions in the Fifth Amendment indicate, at the very least, that the
Framers did not consider the death penalty a "cruel and unu-
sual" punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. We
hardly need rely on the Fifth Amendment to reach this conclu-
sion: capital punishment, like pillorying, branding, and crop-
ping and nailing of the ears, was a penalty commonly imposed
during the founding period. But as I have already noted, even
those who disagree with my ultimate position must acknowledge
that the Eighth Amendment definition of "cruel and unusual" is
not frozen in time. 4 Thus, the fact that the Framers did not view
the death penalty as "cruel and unusual" cannot settle the mat-
ter.35 The resort to this position is nothing less than an abdica-
tion of the judicial responsibility of interpreting the Constitution.
Of course, rejecting the easy answers leaves the more diffi-
cult task of ascertaining and applying the broad principles and
values embodied in the general and relativistic words of the
Eighth Amendment. Mindful of Justice Marshall's warning that
this language "presents dangers of too little ... self-restraint" on
the part of the bench, 6 I attempted in Furman to explain my
understanding that the Eighth Amendment "prohibits the inflic-
tion of uncivilized and inhuman punishments." 37 I summarized
my position in a 1986 lecture at the Harvard Law School:
As I read them, the Bill of Rights generally, and the Eighth
Amendment specifically, insist that the state treat its mem-
bers with respect for their intrinsic worth as human beings,
and this is true even as the state punishes the commission
34. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
35. For general critiques of the originalist mode of constitutional
interpretation, see Ronald Dworkin, LAw's EMPIRE 359-69 (1986); H. Jefferson
Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARv. L. REv. 885
(1985); see also Kent Greenfield, Original Penumbras: Constitutional Interpretation
in the First Year of Congress, 26 CONN. L. REv. 79 (1993). For critiques of
originalism in the specific context of Eighth Amendment interpretation, see
Hugo Adam Bedau, Thinking of the Death Penalty as a Cruel and Unusual
Punishment, 18 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 873 (1985); William J. Brennan, Jr.,
Constitutional Adjudication and the Death Penalty: A View from the Court, 100 HARv.
L. Ruv. 313, 324-26 (1986).
36. Furman, 408 U.S. at 315 (Marshall, J., concurring).
37. Id. at 270 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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of the most brutal crimes.... When we consider why vari-
ous punishments have been condemned by history as bar-
baric, we appreciate that they generally involve the
infliction of great pain. But why do we, and why did the
Framers, care so much about pain? This is not a simple
question, and it does not answer itself. The true signifi-
cance of the thumbscrew, of the iron boot, of the stretch-
ing of limbs, is that they treat members of the human race
as nonhumans, as objects to be hurt and then dis-
carded .... Mutilations and tortures are not unconstitu-
tional merely because they are painful-they would not, I
submit, be saved from unconstitutionality by having the
convicted person sufficiently anesthetized such that no
physical pain were felt; rather, they are unconstitutional
because they are inconsistent with the fundamental prem-
ise of the eighth amendment that "even the vilest criminal
remains a human being possessed of common human
dignity."3"
In a similar address a year earlier at the Hastings College of
Law, I put it this way: "A punishment must not be so severe as to
be utterly and irreversibly degrading to the very essence of
human dignity.... The calculated killing of a human being by
the state involves, by its very nature, an absolute denial of the
executed person's humanity. The most vile murder does not, in
my view, release the state from constitutional restraints on the
destruction of human dignity. Yet an executed person has lost
the very right to have rights, now or ever. For me, then, the fatal
constitutional infirmity of capital punishment is that it treats
members of the human race as nonhumans, as objects to be
toyed with and discarded."3 9
The inevitable dehumanization of those to be executed is
evident in the gruesome spectacle that often unfolds outside a
prison on the night of a scheduled execution. On January 10,
1986, for example, a crowd of more than 200 gathered outside
the Central Correctional Institution of the South Carolina
Department of Corrections for the electrocution of James Terry
Roach, who pleaded guilty five years earlier, at the age of 17, to
the brutal murder of two area teenagers. Some in the crowd car-
ried signs and banners with messages like "Save Energy, Use a
Rope," "Fry Him," "Let the Juice Flow," and "Bon Voyage, Mr.
38. Brennan, supra note 35, at 329-30 (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 273)
(citation omitted).
39. William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 436
(1986).
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Roach."40 I am not aware of, and I cannot imagine, a similar
display ever taking place outside a prison on the day a convicted
murderer arrives to serve the first day of a life sentence.
Some have argued that the view that the death penalty is
cruel and unusual because it treats humans as objects to be hurt
and then discarded is based on little more than personal opin-
ion. But I have always attempted to justify my position by means
of reasoned argument about the meaning of the vague words of
the Eighth Amendment. I submit that it was the dissenters in
Furman who failed to make arguments and to respond to argu-
ments, who failed to explore what values underlie their feelings
and what values the Eighth Amendment was intended to serve. I
have made this point before:
In his Furman dissent, Chief Justice Burger distinguished
capital punishment from "a punishment such as burning at
the stake that everyone would ineffably find repugnant to
all civilized standards." In my view, this is not an argu-
ment; this is simply the view of a singlejudge. Think about
it: burning at the stake is capital punishment.... Death
by electrocution could be described in equally graphic
terms.... Furman might have been characterized not as a
case about the death penalty, but rather as a case about
death by electrocution, which might fairly be described as
"frying in a chair." How would frying in a chair be distin-
guished from burning at a stake?
41
I am convinced that those who argue that the death penalty is
unconstitutional "have made the better-and I mean the better
reasoned-case."
42
There are also those who argue that opponents of the death
penalty are insensitive to the scourge of violent crime, that they
refuse to hold murderers accountable for their crimes, treating
the victimizers as morally equivalent to their victims. Of course,
these arguments do not go to the constitutional issues involved,
but rather to questions of social policy. But apparently it cannot
go without saying, if one is to oppose the death penalty for any
reason, that rampant crime is a serious social ill, and that mur-
derers deserve to be punished. The death penalty may be a reac-
tion to the problem of crime in a particular sense, a "symbolic
40. I saw these signs in television news coverage of the execution. See also
South Carolina Executes Killer: Age Stirs Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1986, at 6;
Craig Walker, Groups Applaud, Condemn Roach Execution, UPI, Jan. 10, 1986
(available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File).
41. Brennan, supra note 35, at 330 (citation omitted).
42. Id. at 331.
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palliative for the fear of crime,"4' but it is not part of the a solu-
tion. Most opponents and supporters of capital punishment
agree that there is no reliable evidence that the death penalty
deters homicide better than life imprisonment. 44 In any event,
our urgent need to curb the problem of crime does not justify
our abandonment of the Constitution. Our desire not to
become victims must not condemn us to become executioners.
III.
These are not the first pages of a legal journal in which I
have defended the position that I first articulated in Furman v.
Georgia. But they may well be the last. I have come to realize that
I shall not likely live to see that "great day for our country...
[and] our Constitution" when a majority of the Supreme Court
finally comes to accept the fact that the death penalty "denies the
humanity and dignity of the victim and transgresses the prohibi-
tion against cruel and unusual punishment."4 5 But even if it is
not for me, as it was not for Justice Marshall, to finish the work,
neither were we free to desist. The final labor, it seems, will be
left to the brave and able hands and minds of those we leave
,behind.
43. ArthurJ Goldberg and Alan M. Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty
Unconstitutional, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1773, 1774 (1970).
44. See, e.g., Dane Archer, Rosemary Gartner, and Marc Beittel, Homicide
and the Death Penalty: A Cross-National Test of A Deterrence Hypothesis, 74 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 991 (1983); John Kaplan, The Problem of Capital Punishment,
1983 U. ILL. L. REv. 555; Lewis F. Powell, Capital Punishment, 102 HARV. L. REv.
1035, 1041 (1989); van den Haag, supra note 33, at 964-65. In fact, there is
evidence that publicized executions may have a "brutalizing" effect on society
that causes homicide rates to increase. See. e.g., William C. Bailey, Disaggregation
in Deterrence and Death Penalty Research: The Case of Murder in Chicago, 74J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGv 827 (1983); WilliamJ. Bowers and Glenn L. Pierce, Deterrence
or Brutalization: What is the Effect of Executions?, 26 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 453
(October 1980).
Even those who favor capital punishment generally state that they would
prefer the alternative of genuine "life imprisonment," which they apparently
believe to be unavailable currently because of the possibility of parole or lenient
sentencing. SeeJ. Mark Lane, "Is There Life Without Parole?" A Capital Defendant's
Right to a Meaningful Alternative Sentence, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 327, 364-65 (1993)
(citing polls). The evidence also indicates that sentencing juries often choose
the death penalty instead of life imprisonment because they are concerned
about the possibility of parole. See id. at 334-43, 364-65; see also Theodore
Eisenberg and Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in Capital
Cases, 79 CoRN. L. REv. 1 (1993).
45. Brennan, supra note 35, at 331.
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